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MISSING POLICE BODY CAMERA VIDEOS:
REMEDIES, EVIDENTIARY FAIRNESS, AND
AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION
Mary D. Fan*
A movement toward police regulation by recording is
sweeping the nation.
Responding to calls for
accountability, transparency and better evidence,
departments have rapidly adopted body cameras.
Recording policies require the police to record more law
enforcement encounters than ever before. But what
happens if officers do not record? This is an important,
growing area of controversy. Based on the collection
and coding of police department body camera policies,
this Article reveals widespread detection and
enforcement gaps regarding failures to record as
required. More than half of the major-city departments
in the sample have no provisions specifying
consequences for not recording as required—and
several have protections against discipline.
The Article discusses how the labor-management
structure of departments and the individual-blame
nature of disciplinary processes render internal
departmental
enforcement
of
recording
rules
challenging. As the central framers of conduct rules for
police, and as gatekeepers of evidence, courts have an
important role to play in addressing the missing video
problem. The challenge is how to frame remedies that
avoid judicial inquiry deterrence: a reluctance to
address missing video issues because it would entail
messy and costly collateral mini-trials on whether
recordings are missing for legitimate reasons or due to

* Henry M. Jackson Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Many
thanks to Ryan Lee Giles, Lee Dean Whatling and the team at the Georgia Law Review for
excellent editing. I am grateful to Andrew Manuel Crespo, Jack McDevitt, Richard Myers
and Glenn Pierce for generative discussions and insights.
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officer malfeasance.
This Article proposes three
judicial pretrial remedies that proceed from a more
administrable
evidentiary
fairness
perspective:
exclusion of partial recordings, favorable inferences,
and pattern and practice detection harnessing systemic
facts accumulated by courts in criminal cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Why did a Minneapolis police officer shoot Justine Damond
after she called to report a possible sexual assault?1 The officers at
the scene were wearing body cameras, but they did not record the
fatal encounter.2 The officers in Baton Rouge who fatally shot
Alton Sterling also were wearing body camerasɆbut both of the
officers involved reported that their cameras fell off.3 Officers also
were wearing body cameras when Keith Scott died in Charlotte,4
and when Paul O’Neal died in Chicago.5 The officer wearing a
body camera at the scene of Scott’s death did not activate the
camera to capture both audio and video until after the shooting.6
The officer who fired the fatal shot into O’Neal’s back during a foot
pursuit also did not hit record until after the fatal shot.7 The
police departments involved in each shooting were among the
hundreds nationwide that have adopted police-worn body cameras
in recent years to rebuild public trust.8 Each of the departments’
1 Andy Mannix, 911 Call Transcript: Before Being Shot by Officer, Justine Damond Called
in Possible Rape, MINN. STAR TRIB. (July 19, 2017, 9:24 PM), http://www.startribune.com/911call-before-being-shot-by-officer-justine-damond-called-in-possible-rape/435423423/.
2 Mark Berman, What the Minneapolis Police Shooting Tells Us About the Limits of Body
Cameras, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), http://wapo.st/2uAnJ0I.
3 See Kimbriell Kelly et al., Fatal Shootings by Police Remain Relatively Unchanged After
Two Years, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2016), http://wapo.st/2hBOTix (“[P]olice said body cameras
‘fell off’ the officers . . . as they responded to a call about a man with a gun outside of a
convenience store.”); see also Aliyah Frumin, After Baton Rouge Shooting, Questions Swirl
Around Body Cam Failures, NBC NEWS (July 7, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/after-baton-rouge-shooting-questions-swirl-around-body-cam-failures-n605386?cid=e
m1_onsite.
4 See Wesley Lowery, Charlotte Officer Did Not Activate Body Camera Until After Keith
Scott Had Been Shot, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2016), http://wapo.st/2cwPtXn.
5 See Annie Sweeney & Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police: Body Camera Didn’t Record Cop’s
Fatal Shooting of Teen in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2016, 7:04 AM), http://www.chicagotribun
e.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shooting-eddie-johnson-met-20160801-story.html.
6 See Lowery, supra note 4 (describing the Scott shooting).
7 William Lee, Autopsy: Paul O’Neal Fatally Shot by Police in Back, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 17,
2016, 8:13 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-police-shooti
ng-eddie-johnson-met-20160801-story.html.
8 See Mike Maciag, Survey: Almost All Police Departments Plan to Use Body Cameras,
GOVERNING (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-polic
e-body-camera-survey.html (reporting on the uptake of police-worn body cameras among
departments across the nation); Brent McDonald & Hillary Bachelder, With Rise of Body
Cameras, New Tests of Transparency and Trust, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2j
axwBF (describing the challenges faced by police departments nationwide in rolling out a
body-camera program).
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policies mandated recording in the context where the shooting
occurred, unless it was unsafe to do so.9 The practice on the
ground, however, did not follow the rules on the books. Numerous
other such cases and controversies involving a failure to record
have arisen across the nation.10

9 See C HARLOTTE -M ECKLENBERG P OLICE D EP ’ T , I NTERACTIVE D IRECTIVES G UIDE ,
DIRECTIVE 400-005 (effective May 11, 2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/NC/Charl
otte_BWC_Policy.pdf (“Officers will ensure that DMVR equipment (both video and audio) is
activated and operating properly and that the video recorder is positioned and adjusted to
record events in the following circumstances: [traffic stops, pursuits, emergency response, and
prisoner transport].”); CHICAGO POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS, SPECIAL ORDER S03-14
(effective May 10, 2016) [hereinafter CHI. PD, ORDER S03-14], https://www.bwcscorecard.org/
static/policies/2016-05-10%20Chicago%20-$20BWC$20Policy.pdf (“Department members
assigned a [Body Worn Camera]: will activate the system to event mode to record the entire
incident for all . . . traffic stops. . . . foot and vehicle pursuits; emergency driving situations;
high-risk situations . . . any encounter with the public that becomes adversarial after the
initial contact; and any other instance when enforcing the law.”); BATON ROUGE POLICE DEP’T,
BODY WORN CAMERAS, No. 502/15-1 (eff. Apr. 23, 2015) (on file with author) (“Body Worn
Camera Recorders shall be utilized to record the following types of events when safe to
activate: . . . All Calls of Service, including backup Officers [and] Other legitimate law
enforcement contacts.”); MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL § 4-223
(effective July 29, 2017), http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mp dpolicy_4-200_4200 (“Officers shall active their BWC for the following circumstances. . . . Any contact
involving allegations of criminal activity . . . . Any use of force situation. If a BWC is not
activated prior to use of force, it shall be activated as soon as it is safe to do so.”).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Daniel, No. 1:16 CR 6 SNLJ (ACL), 2016 WL 4004578, at *5
(E.D. Mo. July 7, 2016) (“[A]ccording to Perryville Police Department policy the body camera
should be used during interactions with suspects. . . . Officer James testified that he believed
his body camera was on throughout the traffic stop, however, it turned out the recorder either
hadn’t been turned on, it was not functioning, or he ‘possibly didn’t use it correctly.’ ”);
Nashelly Chavez, Rocklin Officers Who Shot Former Honor Student Didn’t Turn on Body
Cameras Until Later, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:11 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/ne
ws/local/crime/article136372438.html (did not record until after fatal shooting); Lynh Bui &
Peter Hermann, Federal Officials Indict Seven Baltimore Police Officers on Racketeering,
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), http://wapo.st/2lqLXSU (detailing charges against officers who
allegedly extorted money from civilians, used or threatened force, and turned off their body
cameras during the encounters); Kym Klass, Community Gathers to Remember Greg Gunn,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Ala.) (Feb. 26, 2017, 5:53 PM), http://on.gmadv.com/2lHxDsq
(reporting that the officer failed to turn on his body camera during a stop and chase in which
the officer beat, tased and then fatally shot Greg Gunn); Yihyun Jeong, Completed
Investigation into Flagstaff Officer Punching Woman Sent to Coconino County Attorney, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jan. 3, 2017, 2:18 PM), http://azc.cc/2LPrcle (reporting that an officer turned off his
body camera during an encounter that involved the officer punching a woman); Alex Holloway,
Ricky Ball Shooting: Officers Respond to Ball Lawsuit, COMMERCIAL DISPATCH (Columbus,
Miss.) (Nov. 2, 2016, 10:48 AM), http://www.cdispatch.com/news/article.asp?aid=53932
(reporting that an officer did not activate his body camera during a traffic stop in which the
officer shot and killed Ricky Ball, a passenger).
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What happens when key video evidence is missing, contrary to
the police department’s own rules? This Article illuminates the
murky or absent internal checks on the growing problem of
missing or partial recordings and proposes judicial remedies to
supplement internal enforcement challenges. This Article also
explores the desirability of new technologies that automate the
decision to record and reduce the risk of human error and
noncompliance. Presenting findings from the collection and coding
of available major-city body camera policies, this Article reveals
widespread enforcement gaps in body camera policies.11 More
than half of body camera policies in this sample do not specify
consequences for not recording as required.12 Many also have
express limits regarding the mechanisms for detecting whether
officers follow the recording rules.13 This Article discusses how
police departments are constrained to address the challenges by
labor laws and collective bargaining requirements.14 The issue is
important from both adjudicative justice and public safety
perspectives. There is emerging evidence that wearing body
cameras reduces the use of force among officers who follow the
recording protocol, but increases among officers who wear body
cameras and do not follow the rules.15
In the activist arena, the ACLU of Massachusetts has proposed
a “no tape, no testimony” rule in which courts would instruct juries
to discredit or ignore the testimony of officers if the body camera
recording is missing.16 Some state legislatures are also beginning

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B, Table 2.
13 See infra Part II.B, Tables 1, 3, 4.
14 See infra Part III.A.
15 See Barak Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of BodyWorn Cameras Are Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten
Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453 (2016). For a discussion
of the findings, see infra text accompanying notes 84–86.
16 See ACLU OF MASS. & SAMUELSON LAW, TECH. & PUB. POLICY CLINIC NO TAPE, NO
TESTIMONY 2 (2016) [hereinafter ACLU, NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY], https://aclum.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/11/ACLU_BodyCameras_11.21_final.pdf (proposing an instruction that
“would tell the jury that, if it finds that the police unreasonably failed to create or preserve
a video of a police-civilian encounter, it can devalue an officer’s testimony and infer that the
video would have helped the civilian. If the jury finds that the case involves bad faith, such
as the outright sabotage of body cameras, then it should be instructed to disregard officer
testimony altogether.”).
11
12
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to search for approaches to address the problem.17 Reflecting the
enduring focus on the criminal trial as the arena of primary
contestation in criminal adjudication, early proposals focus on jury
instructions regarding the testimony of officers who fail to record.18
While the attention is salutary, the focus on jury instructions
does not address the vast majority of criminal cases, that is, those
which never make it to trial. More than 90% of criminal
convictions come from plea bargaining, never reaching the juryinstructions phase of trial.19 According to the most recently
available aggregated statistics, 97% of federal convictions,20 and
94% of state felony convictions21 arise from please bargains. As
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]ecause ours ‘is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’ it is
insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a
backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”22
Filling a gap, this Article focuses on pretrial remedies that can
apply to the fuller swathe of criminal procedure cases. This Article
also concludes that remedies for missing video are just a stop-gap
measure. The optimal approach to the missing video problem is
automatic activation to reduce the risk of human error and
noncompliance.
17 See, e.g., H.B. 2737, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017) (making it a Class 3
felony and a firing offense for an officer to knowingly fail to turn on or turn off an officerworn body camera contrary to departmental recording policy when there is a reasonable
opportunity to comply); H.B. 1613, 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017) (providing that an officer who fails
to record using the body camera as required may still testify about the events that should
have been recorded, but the court should instruct the jury to consider the failure to record
“in determining the weight given to [the officer’s] testimony,” or if there is no jury, then the
court should consider the factor in weighing the testimony).
18 E.g., H.B. 1613, 2017 Sess. (Va. 2017). See generally ACLU, NO TAPE, NO TESTIMONY,
supra note 16 (proposing remedies focused on jury instructions and trial testimony).
19 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.5.22.2009 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5
222009.pdf, cited in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
20 Of the 89,741 criminal defendants convicted and sentenced in U.S. District Courts in
2010, 87,418 pled guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE
tbl.5.22.2010 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf.
21 See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 24 tbl.4.1 (2009),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf (reporting data on the types of felony
convictions in state courts in 2006).
22 Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (citation omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170
(2012)).
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The import of the body camera issue will only increase as more
police departments deploy the cameras in order to rebuild public
trust and to fulfill promises of accountability after national turmoil
and protests in the wake of tragic police shootings.23 The strategy
of surveilling the surveillors by using body cameras united an
unusual coalition of civil rights and civil liberties groups and law
enforcement leaders in support of the reforms.24 Body camera
policies now call for recording more law enforcement activities
than ever before, such as stops, frisks, searches, uses of force,
responses to calls, and even consensual encounters in some
jurisdictions.25 Controversial police activities that were formerly
opaque, left to reconstruction in police-said, defendant-said
credibility contests, are now supposed to be illuminated by a more
objective record of what really happened.26
23 See, e.g., Adam A. Marshall & Katie Townsend, Opinion, A Tool to Gain the Public’s
Trust, WASH. POST (May 15, 2015), http://wapo.st/1Fj1zyJ (discussing the impetus for rapid
department adoption of police-worn body cameras); Max Ehrenfreund, Body Cameras for
Cops Could Be the Biggest Change to Come Out of the Ferguson Protests, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Dec. 2, 2014), https://wapo.st/1tHTsl3 (reporting that, in response to incidents
like the shooting of Michael Brown in Missouri, “body-worn cameras will be as ubiquitous in
the world of policing as handcuffs” by 2019).
24 See, e.g., Press Release, NAACP ET AL., Civil Rights Coalition Urges National Reforms
and Recommendations to Address Police Abuse (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.naacp.org/latest/c
ivil-rights-coalition-urges-national-reforms-and-recommendations-to-addres/ (calling for police
to wear body cameras); Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law et al., A Unified
Statement of Action to Promote Reform and Stop Police Abuse (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.
aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/black_leaders_joint_statement_-_final_-_8-18.pdf (a joint
statement of multiple civil rights and civil liberties groups urging the adoption of police-worn
body cameras); Maciag, supra note 8 (reporting on the widespread adoption of police-worn
body cameras by departments around the nation).
25 See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 932 (2017) [hereinafter Fan, Justice Visualized] (reporting findings on
common contexts where body camera policies require recording).
26 See, e.g., AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL, POLICY 303, at 128 (issued Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police/APD_Policy_Manual.pdf
(“The use of Body Worn Digital Recording (BWDR) system provides an unbiased audio/video
recording of events that employees encounter.”); CHI. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS,
Special Order S03-14, § I (effective June 9, 2017), https://directives.chicagopolice.org (search in
search bar for “S03-14”; then follow “Body Worn Cameras” hyperlink) (stating that body-worn
cameras can “improve the quality and reliability of investigations and increase transparency”);
PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, BODY-WORN CAMERAS, DIRECTIVE 4.21, § 1 (issued Jan. 15, 2016,
updated Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter PHILA. PD, BWC DIR.], http://www.phillypolice.com/asse
ts/diretives/D4.21-BodyWornCameras.pdf (explaining that body-worn cameras “provide an
unbiased audio and video recording of events that officers encounter”); Fan, Justice Visualized,
supra note 25, at 919–20 (discussing the imbalance of power and ability to speak in defendantsaid, police-said credibility contests).
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Yet, amid this revolution on paper, emerging reports from the
field indicate that some body-worn cameras are disabled or turned
off when they are supposed to be recording.27 Even when it comes
to the more established technology of patrol car dash cameras,
findings by Chicago police officials indicate that 80% of recordings
fail to capture audio due to officer error or “intentional
destruction.”28 Selective recording and non-recording poses the
risk of subverting the promise that led communities across the
nation to embrace more surveillance by police body cameras in
exchange for improved accountability and transparency.29 If the
problem is left unchecked, rather than being a tool of police
accountability, body camera recordings could amplify the problems
of a gross imbalance in power. Video recordings can offer more
powerful evidence to speed up a plea bargain or conviction or
justify a search or seizure.30 But recordings that might exonerate
or implicate officers are missing.31
27 See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Justin Fenton & Kevin
Rector, 7 Officers Charged with Racketeering: Members of City Gun Task Force Accused of
Robbing Civilians, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 2, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6558848 (reporting
prosecutors’ allegations that seven Baltimore police officers who were indicted for
racketeering turned off their body cameras before threatening civilians to extract
payments); Tim Cushing, ACLU Suggests Jury Instructions Might Be A Fix For ‘Missing’
Body Camera Recordings, TECHDIRT, Dec. 3, 2016, 2016 WLNR 36979699 (“Body cameras
are pretty much mainstream at this point, but when excessive force and/or misconduct are
alleged, footage captured by police is often nonexistent. Officers disable recording
equipment, delete footage, or simply claim the camera ‘malfunctioned.’ Some repeatedly
‘forget’ to activate their cameras ahead of controversial arrests and interactions.”).
28 Radley Balko, 80 Percent of Chicago PD Dash-Cam Videos are Missing Audio Due to
‘Officer Error’ or ‘Intentional Destruction,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), http://wapo.st/1nCW
5d0.
29 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODYWORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2014) [hereinafter
JUSTICE DEP’T BWC RECS.], http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/4720149121347152468
69.pdf (discussing the accountability and transparency concerns that prompt police
departments and communities to adopt police body cameras).
30 See, e.g., State v. Herrin, No. 1 CA-CR 12-0141, 2012 WL 3233227, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Aug. 9, 2012) (dash camera recording used to secure a felony conviction for resisting arrest);
United States v. Bryant, No. 1:15CR99-1, 2015 WL 2248177, at *1, *5 (M.D.N.C. May 13,
2015) (reviewing officer body camera footage and concluding that the defendant’s nervous
demeanor helped justify the stop when the encounter was no longer consensual in nature),
rev’d, 654 F. App’x 622 (4th Cir. 2016); State v. Gibbons, No. 2012-UP-177, 2012 WL
10841329, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2012) (recording of defendant’s arrest used to secure
convictions for first-degree harassment and resisting arrest).
31 See, e.g., Richardson v. Mahon, No. 4:15-cv-3317-RBH-TSR, 2017 WL 430862
(S.D.S.C.), vacated on other grounds, 2017 WL 4262517 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2017) (alleging
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Courts, as the central framers of criminal procedure rules and
evidentiary gatekeepers, have an important role to play in
deterring selective recording and non-recording and ensuring an
accurate and fair evidentiary record.32 The challenge is how to
fashion remedies that do not altogether deter judicial inquiry
because they require collateral mini-trials on whether officers had
legitimate reasons for not recording or whether they acted in bad
faith.33 This Article proposes remedies flowing from a more
administrable evidentiary fairness framework that spares courts
from having to wade into the morass of individual blame before
offering a remedy.34 Remedies that reflect this approach include
excluding partial recordings and drawing favorable inferences for
This Article also proposes drawing on the
the defense.35
institutional capacity of courts as repositories of evidence and
filings in order to detect patterns and practices of violations in
need of redress.36 Finally, this Article discusses the desirability of
deploying new technologies that automate the decision to record,
reducing both the risk of human error or resistance and the need
for judicial intervention.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II frames the growing
problem of the gap between the promise to record more police
encounters than ever before and noncompliance on the ground.
This part also discusses the widespread silence regarding
sanctions in recording policies for failure to record. Part III
discusses why departments face difficulties disciplining officers for

that officer failed to record plaintiff’s arrest via body camera or dash camera though other
officers said the events should have been recorded); United States v. Daniel, No. 1:16 CR 6
SNLJ (ACC), 2016 WL 4004578, at *5 (E.D. Mo. July 7, 2016) (noting absence of the
recording of key contested events despite policy which required recording via body camera).
See also Tim Cushing, If Police Officials Won’t Hold Officers Accountable, More Cameras
Will Never Mean More Recordings, TECHDIRT, Aug. 11, 2016, 2016 WLNR 24414477
(discussing examples of police failures to record); examples cited, supra note 2–5, and
discussion, infra Part II.
32 See infra Part IV.
33 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
35 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1–2.
36 See infra Part IV.B.3; see also Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward
Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051–54 (2016)
(encouraging criminal courts to better utilize their specialized institutional knowledge of
the criminal justice system in order to participate effectively in efforts “to reform the failed
criminal justice state”).
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failing to record as required or even specifying what, if any,
sanctions apply. Part IV argues that courts have an important
role to play in addressing the missing-video problem and the
incapacity of departments to self-police. This part offers three
pretrial remedies to incentivize compliance and ensure fair
evidentiary use of the audiovisual record in criminal cases.
Finally, Part V concludes by arguing that the optimal approach is
to deploy new technologies that automate police-worn body camera
recording, thus alleviating the missing video problem and the need
for judicial intervention.
II. AFTER THE RECORDING REVOLUTION: THE MISSING VIDEO
PROBLEM
Revolutions offer grand promises of transformation that seize
attention and tantalize the imagination.37 But the real impact—if
any—of a revolution is determined in the messy days after the
revolution, during the implementation of the promises.38 It is in
implementation that promises come to fruition or go unrealized—
or even invert, offering the opposite of what people hoped.39 Now
is the crucial time that will frame the real impact of the recording
revolution in police regulation.
Shaken by protests over police use of force, and recurrent
deaths of young minority men, departments across the nation have
promised to adopt body cameras to rebuild trust, address
accusations, and promote accountability.40 The rapid shift since
37 See, e.g., Matt Viser & Annie Linsky, Grand Promises Stir Voter Passions, But Are Hard
to Keep, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/01/25/do
nald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-lead-pack-with-unrealistic-promises/CxkGiorOezl2d365xtQIg
K/story.html (discussing the “pie-in-the-sky” policies 2016 presidential candidates Donald J.
Trump and Bernie Sanders espoused during their respective campaigns).
38 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 27, 72, 96 (1992)
(discussing the challenges of implementing promises made during a revolution once “normal
politics” has resumed in a post-revolution society).
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., POLICE COMPLAINTS BD., ENHANCING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH AN
EFFECTIVE ON-BODY CAMERA PROGRAM FOR MPD OFFICERS 3–4 (2014), https://policecomplain
ts.dc.gov/publication/enhancing-police-accountability-through-effective-body-camera-prog rammpd-officers (follow “Attachment” hyperlink) (recommending that the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department utilize body-worn cameras to “reduce the incidence of
complaint-generating events,” to foster a culture of respect between the police and the public,
and to hold accountable those officers that have broken the law or department policy); JUSTICE
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late 2014 has been remarkable. In 2013, few departments had
body cameras.41 Police officers had concerns over wearing the
intrusive technology.42 Since the national protests over police
killings, and calls by civil rights and civil liberties groups for police
to wear body cameras, the vast majority of departments have
announced plans to deploy the technology.43 Then-President
Barack Obama’s announcement in late 2014 of plans to offer
millions of dollars in grant funding for body cameras further fueled
the scramble to adopt programs.44
On the books, recording policies seem to present a major
transparency paradigm shift, mandating recording of most law
enforcement activities such as stops, searches, arrests, uses of
force, responses to calls, and more.45 On the ground, however,
challenges involving the nonrecording or selective recording of
police activities are emerging.46 This part presents the growing
challenge of missing video after the body camera revolution and
how recording policies often do not specify what, if any, sanctions
apply.

DEP’T BWC RECS., supra note 29, at 6–7 (discussing the positive feedback from police
departments regarding the use of body cameras).
41 See, e.g., JUSTICE DEP’T BWC RECS., supra note 29, art. 2 (reporting that, in 2013, less
than a quarter of the 254 police departments surveyed used body cameras).
42 See Tami Abdollah, Officers’ Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 15, 2014, WESTLAW (“[S]ome rank-and-file officers are worried [body cameras]
might ultimately be used to derail their careers . . . .”); O’Ryan Johnson & Erin Smith,
Concern on Both Sides: BPD Brass, Union Fear Cameras on Cops, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 4,
2014, 2014 WLNR 34249221 (discussing the concerns of top Boston police officials that
people in “crime-battered neighborhoods” might not want to speak with the police if they
knew they were being recorded).
43 See Maciag, supra note 8 (reporting that 95% of seventy police departments surveyed
had plans to adopt or had adopted body cameras).
44 See DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2015) [hereinafter
DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT], http://extras.denverpost.com/Denver_Monitor_2014_
Annual_Report.pdf (“Many police chiefs . . . scrambled to announce BWC programs . . . after
the President’s announcement.”); Carrie Dann & Andrew Rafferty, Obama Requests $263
Million for Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/obama-requests-263-million-police-body-cameras-training-n25
9161 (reporting that, in the wake of tragic police shootings, the Obama White House requested
“$263 million in funding for police body cameras and training”).
45 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 932 (“Nearly all [police] departments
mandate recording of Terry and traffic stops, searches, arrest, pursuits, and responses to
calls for service.”).
46 See discussion supra notes 3–10 and infra notes 47–77 and accompanying text.
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A. NEW CONTROVERSIES OVER RECURRING TRAGEDIES

On a San Francisco street, sheriff’s deputies beat suspected
auto thief Stanislav Petrov with metal batons, inflicting multiple
head and arm injuries that required twelve days of
hospitalization.47 Ten out of the eleven responding officers did not
activate their body cameras.48 The eleventh officer’s body camera
did activate—by accident.49 The incident came to light when
residents, whose private security cameras captured the incident,
gave the public defender’s office their recordings.50 At the time,
the Alameda Sheriff’s Department policy encouraged sheriffs to
use their body cameras to record, but did not mandate it.51 After
the controversy over the case, the sheriff’s department revised its
policy to require recording.52
Requiring recording of law enforcement activities is an
increasingly prevalent approach.53 Is a policy mandate to record
police encounters enough to address the failure to activate the
body camera? Controversies and findings from other jurisdictions
suggest the answer is no. Even in the growing number of
jurisdictions where department policies require recording, some
officers have not activated their body cameras or hit record only
after the key event, such as a use of force or traffic stop.54
Consider, for example, the experience of early departmental
pioneers that piloted body cameras before the rush. The Phoenix
47 See Dan Lawton, Alameda County Deputy Beating Prompts Change in Body Camera
Policy, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2016, 5:32 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/29/al
ameda-county-deputy-beating-prompts-change-in-body-camera-policy/; Melanie Woodrow,
Alameda County Deputy Beating Case Prompts Camera Policy Change, ABC7 NEWS (Mar. 29,
2016), http://abc7news.com/news/alameda-county-deputy-beating-case-prompts-policy-change/
1267601/.
48 Gretel Kauffman, How Police Departments Are Ensuring the Use of Body Cameras,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 7, 2016, 2016 WLNR 24034840.
49 Id.
50 California Deputies Charged in Beating Captured on Video, CBS NEWS (May 10, 2016,
6:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-deputies-charged-in-beating-captured-on-vi
deo/.
51 See Lawton, supra note 47 (noting that, prior to the Petrov incident, it was “optional
for deputies to turn on their cameras”).
52 Id.
53 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 932 tbl.2 (listing enforcement events and
the number of surveyed departments that require recording of the event—most had adopted
the mandatory recording of the police activities included in the survey).
54 See infra notes 55–77.
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Police Department body camera policy instructed officers that the
“camera must be activated during all investigative or enforcement
contacts, which includes traffic stops.55 Yet, a recent evaluation of
the impact of body-worn cameras in the department found that a
mere 6.5% of traffic stops were recorded.56 Officers were most
likely to use their body cameras to record domestic violence calls,57
where the evidentiary value of recordings for prosecution are
particularly crucial because victims frequently recant.58 Even
then, less than half (47.5%) of domestic-violence incidents were
recorded.59
As another police department ahead of the curve in piloting
body cameras, the Denver Police Department’s results are also
instructive.60 The department’s body camera policy required
activation in numerous contexts, such as “[p]edestrian, citizen
and/or vehicle contacts,” and “[a]ny encounter that becomes
adversarial.”61 Yet, the Independent Monitor overseeing the
department found that, during the six-month pilot program, only
twenty-one of eighty uses of force were recorded by body-worn
cameras—just 26% of such critical incidents.62 Unrecorded uses of
force included incidents such as punching a suspect in the face,
baton strikes, pushing, pepper-spraying, and tasing suspects.63
55 PHOENIX POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN VIDEO TECHNOLOGY – PILOT, OPERATIONS ORDER
4.49, § 5 (effective Apr. 2013).
56 CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., ARIZ. STATE UNIV. CTR. FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CMTY.
SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE
DEPARTMENT 22 (2014), http://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_fi
nal.pdf.
57 Id. at 22.
58 See also SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T, AXON BODY WORN CAMERAS, PROCEDURE 1.49, § V
(2015) [hereinafter SAN DIEGO PD, PROCEDURE 1.49], https://rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/CA/
SanDiegoBWCPolicy_update.pdf (“Domestic violence victims often recant their statements
as early as the following morning after a crime. Some victims go so far as to testify that the
officer fabricated their statement. Victims may also make their children unavailable for
investigators or court to avoid their providing statements.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1,
14–16 (2006) (explaining that domestic violence victims frequently succumb to pressures
from batterers and recant, refuse to testify, disappear, or refuse to press charges).
59 KATZ ET AL., supra note 56, at 22.
60 The Denver Police Department piloted body cameras beginning in June 2014.
See
DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 8.
61 DENVER POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA, POLICY 111.11, § 3 (finalized Sept. 1,
2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/CO/DenverCO_BWC_policy_update.pdf.
62 DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 10.
63 Id. at 13, 20, 24–25.
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Some of the non-recording occurred because supervisors or off-duty
officers were not required to wear body cameras at the time.64 Yet,
even among officers who were patrolling on-duty and required to
use body cameras, only 47% of the forty-five uses of force were
recorded despite the rules.65
While recording policy noncompliance rates are not available for
many other departments, scandals and deaths are revealing
problems.66 In Baltimore, an investigation into officers who
allegedly used traffic stops, home entries, and false warrants to
rob civilians also revealed how the officers would regularly turn off
their body cameras during such encounters.67 Baltimore Police
Department policy clearly and concisely mandates body camera
activation during any “activity that is investigative or enforcement
in nature” or “any encounter that becomes confrontational.”68 The
alleged behavior on the ground, if proven true, would be a mockery
of the rules.
In Chicago, the national controversy over the shooting of
seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald—and the missing audio from
the five patrol car dash cameras at the scene—led to a departmental
investigation.69 The investigation found that 80% of dash cameras
had “no functioning audio.”70 Intentional destruction and officer
error have contributed to the widespread problem.71 After a
disciplinary crackdown that included random checks and
punishment, the volume of video uploaded after each shift increased

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 17.
66 See supra notes 3–10 and accompanying text.
67 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Seven Baltimore City Police Officers Arrested for Abusing
Power in Federal Racketeering Conspiracy (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/
pr/seven-baltimore-city-police-officers-arrested-abusing-power-federal-racketeering.
68 BALTIMORE POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERAS PILOT PROGRAM POLICY 824 (effective
Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-10-26%20Baltimore%20-$2
0BWC%20Policy.pdf.
69 See Jeremy Gorner, Nearly 2 Dozen Chicago Cops Disciplined for Faulty Dashboard
Cameras, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2016, 6:56 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/
editorials/ct-chicago-police-disciplined-met-20160106-story.html (describing the discipline
officers have received after the shooting as a result of investigations into officers’ use of
dash-cams).
70 Id.
71 See Balko, supra note 28 (reporting the various ways Chicago officers prevent dashcam audio from being recorded, including “stash[ing] microphones in their squad car glove
boxes” and “pull[ing] out batteries”).
64
65
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by 75%.72 But the national spotlight on missing video in Chicago
did not end there.
Responding to calls for transparency, the Chicago Police had
expanded its body camera program when officers fatally shot
eighteen-year-old Paul O’Neal after he crashed a stolen Jaguar
into police cars and then ran away on foot.73 Chicago’s body
camera policy calls for officers to record all foot and vehicle
pursuits, emergency driving situations and “any other instance
while enforcing the law,” among many enumerated contexts.74 But
the officer who shot O’Neal did not activate his body camera and
catch the crucial moments.75
Chicago and Baltimore are hardly alone in the missing video
controversy. The problem is underscored by the nonrecording of
fatal shootings in numerous other jurisdictions that have adopted
body cameras, such as Flagstaff, Arizona; Rocklin, California;
Columbus, Missouri; Charlotte, North Carolina; and Montgomery,
Alabama.76 In San Diego, it was the unrecorded fatal shooting of
police officers wearing body cameras that underscored the
problem, and how the protection of police as well as civilian lives
are at stake.77
Using technology to improve the behavior of the police and
public seems like an elegant idea, drawing on the principles
behind Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon.78 The Panoptic
ideal is that people behave better when they know they are being
watched, deploying pervasive surveillance to induce self-policing of
behavior.79 The challenge is that the Panopticon was a plan for
See Gorner, supra note 69.
See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5.
74 CHI. PD, ORDER S03-14, supra note 9, § II.A.2.
75 Police believe the officer did not intentionally disable the body camera. Rather, “the
crash or the officer’s lack of experience operating the camera” were likely causes of the
nonrecording. See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5.
76 See supra notes 3–10.
77 Amanda Lee Myers, Fatal Police Shooting Highlights Inconsistent Body Cam Usage,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://apnews.com/13112c126c9642bdbb21a1db47b2873f.
78 See Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 102 (2012) [hereinafter Fan,
Panopticism] (discussing the extension of Panoptic principles to police regulation).
79 See Miran BožoviĀ, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 8,
11–18 (Miran BožoviĀ ed., 1995) (summarizing Bentham’s idea for a Panopticon prison,
where inmates would be situated around an opaque watchtower so they were constantly
visible to guards).
72
73
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controlling prisoners.80 Police officers are not prisoners, and the
police have more power to resist panoptic control, as illustrated by
the controversial cases of unrecorded use of force by officers
wearing body cameras surfacing around the nation.81
Failure to record perversely undermines the very public trust
and safety goals that led communities across the nation to adopt
body cameras.82 Early studies suggesting that body cameras
reduce the use of force and complaints by citizens are oft-cited by
people hoping for a technological fix to one of the most challenging
problems of our times.83 Yet new findings suggest the situation is
more complex.
The first findings from the largest set of randomized controlled
trials of the effectiveness of body cameras revealed that uses of
force jumped by 71% among officers who did not follow the
recording protocol and instead recorded at their discretion.84 In
contrast, among officer who followed the protocol, the use of force
decreased by 37% among body cameras wearers compared to
controls.85 Adherence matters—and nonadherence by officers
equipped with body cameras may be associated with perversely
heightened risk.86 Addressing failure to record is thus important
80 See Fan, Panopticism, supra note 78, at 102 (“Bentham’s original conception
envisioned facilitating more efficient and effective governance of prison inmates . . . .”).
81 See supra notes 3–10, 47–77.
82 See MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE
EVIDENCE 19 (2014), http://cvpcs.asu.edu/products/police-officer-body-worn-cameras-assessi
ng-evidence (follow “Documents” hyperlink) (noting that body cameras “can demonstrate to
the community that officers aim to act in a fair and just manner”).
83 See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and
Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015) (reporting results from a Rialto, California trial
finding that officers who did not wear body cameras had twice the incidence of uses of force
compared to officers randomly selected to wear body cameras); KATZ ET AL., supra note 56,
at 33 (finding a 22.5% decline in complaints against officers in a precinct that tested body
cameras during a time when complaints were rising in other precincts); WHITE, supra note
82, at 17–18 (finding a decline in complaints against Mesa, Arizona, police officers after the
introduction of body cameras); Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and Cameras: Officer
Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549,
550 (2014) (discussing a Mesa (Arizona) Police Department evaluation which found a 40%
decline in complaints against officers and a 75% decrease in use of force incidents after the
introduction of body cameras).
84 Ariel et al., supra note 15, at 459–61.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 461 (suggesting that “the selective activation of cameras by police is a
corollary to situations that are already escalating in aggression,” and that “activating a
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to both public safety and public trust, and can help improve the
accuracy of adjudicating contested events.
B. WHAT HAPPENS IF OFFICERS DON’T FOLLOW THE RECORDING
RULES?

What happens to officers who refuse or otherwise fail to record
pursuant to their department’s body camera policy? How do we
even know if officers have cameras off when they are supposed to
be recording? These questions are important because, without the
ability to assess and incentivize compliance, recording policies are
fancy dress over the same recurring problem. This section reports
findings regarding nonrecording detection mechanisms and
sanctions from the collection and coding of body camera policies
from police departments serving the 100 largest cities in the
United States.
The author and a research team composed of research
assistants and law librarians conducted online searches,
supplemented by direct contact with police departments, to
ascertain the body camera adoption status and availability of a
policy.87 The team focused on the primary police department
serving each municipal area, rather than specialized agencies such
as the Highway Patrol, because the primary department generally
has the broadest portfolio of activities.88 In the course of collecting
the policies, the team found that as of late 2015—about a year
after the call for body cameras by civil liberties and civil rights
groups89 and the President90—eighty-eight of the one hundred
major-city departments had either piloted or deployed body
cameras, or at least had plans to do so.91 Through searches of
public materials and requests to the departments, the team

camera during a tense situation may serve to increase the aggression of the citizen/suspect
(and thus the officer)”).
87 The author and research team have no external sources of funding or conflicts to report.
88 See, e.g., David N. Falcone & L. Edward Wells, The County Sheriff as a Distinctive
Policing Modality, 14 AM. J. POLICE 123, 123–26 (1995) (explaining distinctions between
law enforcement agencies).
89 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
91 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 931 (reporting the findings).
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collected and coded fifty-nine policies available as of December
2016.92
This sample yielded diversity of region and city size. The
regions represented and city sizes ranged from more than 8.5
million people in New York City to less than 250,000 people in
cities such as Fremont, California; Gilbert, Arizona; Chesapeake,
Virginia; and Madison, Wisconsin.93 Appendix A lists the fiftynine cities for which we collected and coded departmental body
camera policies. The fifty-nine-policy sample set is more than
twice as large as the collection of twenty-three body camera
policies mapped by the Brennan Center.94 It includes thirty-eight
major cities not covered in that set, such as Atlanta, Boston,
Cleveland, Houston, Miami, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and St.
Louis. The study also codes substantive positions beyond a simple
yes or no—for example, the type of consequences for not activating
one’s body camera, rather than just whether the policy has
consequences. This project thus builds upon and advances prior
important work.
The results reported here are based on the coding of variables
addressing three clusters of key questions for the detection and
enforcement of recording rule violations:
(1) Reporting and other detection mechanisms.
What, if anything, does an officer have to do upon
a failure to record pursuant to policy? Are there
other mechanisms for detecting failures to record
as required?
(2) Sanctions or other consequences. What, if
any, consequences are specified for a failure to
record?
(3) Officer protections against detection and
discipline. Do the policies contain provisions
92 Of the policies, seven were draft policies, while the vast majority were finalized to
govern at least a pilot deployment in the field.
93 For population size data, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE
RESIDENT POPULATION FOR INCORPORATED PLACES OF 50,000 OR MORE, RANKED BY JULY 1,
2016 POPULATION: APRIL 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableser
vices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml.
94 Police Body Camera Policies: Accountability, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/police-body-camera-policies-accountability.
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limiting the ability to detect violations of the
recording requirements and/or the ability to
impose discipline for violations?
Codes for the main types of policy positions were generated
through an iterative process, based on an evaluation of the
provisions.95 The distribution of policy positions are summarized
in Tables 1–4 below.

95 For background on policy coding, see, e.g., Charles Tremper et al., Measuring Law for
Evaluation Research, 34 EVALUATION REV. 242, 252–55 (2010).
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Table 1. Do Officers Have to Report Failures to Record?
59 Major-City Police Department Policies*
Policy Position

Number of
Agencies

Proportion
of Sample

Must explain in report, activity
log, or other memorandum or
database (“in writing”)

17

29%

Must explain on camera, in
writing, or both, and notify
supervisor

8

14%

Must explain on camera and in
writing

4

7%

Must explain on camera only

1

2%

Must notify supervisor only

1

2%

Must be able to articulate reason
for nonrecording but no reporting
requirement

1

2%

Must explain early deactivation
but no provision for failure to
record altogether

14

24%

No provision on reporting failures
to record

11

19%

* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive and some
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will
not sum to 59/100%.
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Table 2. Consequences for Failure to Record
59 Major-City Police Department Policies*
Policy Position

Number of
Agencies

Proportion
of Sample

Express provision that failure to
record or noncompliance is subject
to discipline

9

15%

Written reprimand on first violation,
one fined day and officer usage audit
on second, and formal disciplinary
case on third with “severe”
disciplinary action for “purposeful,
flagrant or repeated violations”

1

2%

Failure to activate is deemed a
violation if it is to commit a
violation of law or policy

1

2%

Supervisors have discretion to use
non-disciplinary sanctions

1

2%

Counseling or training rather than
discipline

4

7%

Express provisions against
disciplinary consequences (with or
without exceptions for repeated
patterns or intentional violations)

4

7%

No provision on consequences

35

59%

* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive, and some
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will
not sum to 59/100%.
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Table 3. Supervisorial Review or Compliance Audits
59 Major-City Police Department Policies*
Policy Position

Number of
Agencies

Proportion
of Sample

Supervisors are required to
regularly view a sample of
recordings for compliance

22

37%

Audits for policy compliance
authorized

20

34%

Supervisor may view recordings
generally

6

10%

Supervisors may not use recordings
for evaluation unless there is an
adverse event trigger (e.g., citizen
complaint, good cause)

4

7%

An adverse event and higher
authorization are required for
supervisor evaluation

5

8%

No provision for supervisor review

6

10%

* Because these policies are not mutually exclusive, and some
agencies are represented in more than one category, the numbers will
not sum to 59/100%.
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Table 4. Limits on Disciplinary Use of Recordings
59 Major-City Police Department Policies*
Policy Position

Number of
Agencies

Proportion
of Sample

May not use recordings to search
for violations without cause and/or
no random review for disciplinary
purposes

11

19%

Minor violations found in
recordings should not be subject to
discipline

10

17%

Review of videos related to specific
adverse event should focus only on
that event and relevant recordings
pertaining to it

6

10%

Internal Affairs or similar unit may
not view recordings unless formal
complaint, higher authorization or
official investigation

2

3%

* Because this table reports the prevalence of officer-protective
positions, and not all policies have such provisions, the figures will not
sum to 59/100%.

As Table 1 reports, just over half of the sample of major-city
policies (51%) have provisions on documenting failures to record
via camera, in writing, or both. To further strengthen detection, a
few departments combine the documentation with supervisor
notification. Conversely, nearly half of the major-city departments
do not require that officers document in some written or video
record when and why they failed to record an event that required
recording. One department requires officers to notify a supervisor
about the failure to record, but there is no documentation
requirement. Nearly a quarter of the departments (24%) require
the officer to explain the reasons for early deactivation of the
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recording, but do not address the complete failure to record an
event.
Auditing or supervisorial review of a sample of videos for
compliance is an alternative method of detecting some forms of
noncompliance with recording rules.96 Of the sample, 37% require
supervisors to regularly review a sample of their officers’
recordings for policy compliance. This strategy puts the burden of
detection on supervisors. It is more likely to catch issues with
early termination of recording rather than nonrecording, because
supervisors review what is recorded, rather than what is not
recorded. The San Diego Police Department has an additional
strategy to address the challenge of detecting failures to record
altogether. Supervisors are required to see if “the number of
enforcement contacts match up to the number of videos
submitted.”97 Audits are another detection strategy. The study
reveals that, among the major-city departments, 34% authorize
audits for compliance.
A number of the major-city policies have protections against
supervisor review of recordings for evaluation and discipline
purposes.
As Table 3 summarizes, 15% of the major-city
departments limit supervisor review of recordings absent an
adverse-event trigger such as a citizen complaint or use of force.
In addition, some of those departments require higher
authorization as well as an adverse event before supervisors may
review videos. As Table 4 shows, 19% of the policies have express
provisions against the use of recordings to actively search for
violations and/or prohibit random review of recordings for
disciplinary purposes. Ten percent of the policies specify that,
even when an adverse event necessitates viewing the videos, the
review should focus on the specific adverse event and recordings
pertaining to it. Another more prevalent protection, found in 17%
of the policies, provides that minor violations documented in
recordings should not be subject to discipline.
The majority of the major-city policies (59%) lack any provisions
regarding the consequences for failure to record. Ten percent
96 Cf. Gorner, supra note 69 (describing the “random checks” by investigators to
determine whether Chicago police officers were properly reporting issues with dashboard
cameras to their supervisors).
97 SAN DIEGO PD, PROCEDURE 1.49, supra note 57.
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contain an express provision against disciplinary consequences.
As for those policies that do address consequences, the most
prevalent approach (15% of the sample) is a general warning that
failure to record or noncompliance with the body-worn camera
policy is subject to investigation and/or discipline. The Denver
Police Department—whose Independent Monitor wrote extensively
about noncompliance and the need to specify sanctions98—is a
notable exception because of its detailed schedule of sanctions for
failures to record.99 Some departments (7%) even expressly tell
officers that noncompliance with the body-worn camera recording
policy will generally not result in disciplinary consequences.100
III. INTERNAL DEPARTMENTAL ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
To satisfy calls for accountability, transparency, and better
evidence, body camera policies are full of recording
On paper, a transformation seems to be
requirements.101
underway. But recording rules that provide little incentive to
comply is only a reform on paper.102 As the results reported in
Part II.B reveal, the majority of major-city body camera policies
that are publicly available are silent about the consequences for
refusing to record as required. Policies are somewhat stronger on
strategies for reporting and detecting noncompliance, but, even
then, omissions are widespread.103 Moreover, several major-city
police department policies contain protections against the review
and use of recordings for evaluation and disciplinary purposes.104
This policy landscape, with its enforcement gaps, is shaped by
the major challenges that police leaders face in introducing an
See discussion, supra notes 60–65.
See DENVER POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL, BODY WORN CAMERA TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY 119.04, § 12 (effective Sept. 15, 2017) [hereinafter DENVER PD MANUAL] (listing
sanctions for violating the body-worn camera policy, ranging from oral reprimands for the
first violation in twelve-month period to “more severe disciplinary action” for “[p]urposeful,
flagrant, or repeat[ ] violations”).
100 See supra Table 2.
101 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 928–34 (discussing the results of study
into the recording requirements of police departments).
102 See, e.g., DENVER OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, supra note 44, at 30 (reporting that
the failure to inform officers of possible sanctions for noncompliance with recording
requirements may have contributed to the substantial number of failures to record).
103 See supra Table 3.
104 See supra Table 4.
98
99
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intrusive change to how rank-and-file officers must operate.105
The internal enforcement challenges are inherent in the structure
of police departments. This section discusses two major challenges
that render internal enforcement difficult and necessitate external
intervention or “cover” to police leaders to effectuate change. First
is the management-labor relationship between those who are
introducing and enforcing recording requirements and those who
must bear the burdens.106 Labor laws and unions give line officers
the power to resist or delay deployment of body cameras unless
they have input on the recording rules.107 Second is the individual
Internal
fault-based nature of the discipline process.108
disciplinary processes entail navigating the blurry zone between
important and legitimate reasons for omissions of recording and
subversion or resistance.109
A. THE DISCIPLINE DILEMMA

Police leaders adopting body cameras to rebuild public trust
and allay controversies face a dilemma. For cameras to produce
the desired benefits of reducing uses of force and citizen
complaints, officers must actually use the technology as
Consequences for rule violations are the usual
directed.110
strategy to incentivize compliance.111 The need to spell out
consequences for noncompliance is no secret. Indeed, the Bureau
of Justice Assistance provides the following advice to police
departments:
A department’s policy should also clearly indicate what
will happen to an officer who fails to activate a camera
in circumstances where activation is required. Will

See discussion infra notes 113–29.
See discussion infra notes 113–29.
107 See discussion infra notes 113–29.
108 See discussion infra notes 140–65.
109 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.
110 See Ariel et al., supra note 15, at 459–62 (arguing that body cameras “should remain
on throughout the [officer’] entire shift,” and officers should not retain discretion to activate
the devices).
111 Compare Austin’s famous classical formulation of law as a command that a sovereign
may enforce through the threat of a sanction.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5 (Noonday Press 1954).
105
106
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the officer be subject to discipline? If so, how will he or
she be disciplined? The consequences for failure to
activate as well as premature deactivation should be
clearly stated.112
The problem is that spelling out sanctions is easier to recommend
than to accomplish in practice. Introducing body cameras requires
buy-in from the ranks—and potentially court battles with the
police union over the change in working conditions and whether
recording rules must be collectively bargained.113 Under federal
labor laws, collective bargaining with the workers’ union is
required when the conditions imposed by management constitute a
material change to the applicable labor contract secured through
collective bargaining.114
Through this leverage, or the specter of it, police labor unions
have successfully secured limits on the use of recordings for officer
monitoring, evaluation and discipline.115 Sometimes, as in the
112 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 21 (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/bwc_faqs.pdf.
113 See, e.g., Ben Conarck, Jacksonville Sheriff, Police Union Clash Over Body Camera Rules,
FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 8, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6684923 (reporting on a dispute
between the local police union and the sheriff over whether body camera rules are subject to
mandatory collective bargaining); Brian Bakst, Maplewood Police Officers Challenge Body
Camera Policy in Lawsuit, MPR NEWS (Minn.) (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.mprnews.org/stor
y/2016/11/21/maplewood-police-officers-challenge-body-camera-policy-lawsuit (reporting on
lawsuit by police officers who objected to random audits of body camera recordings and argued
that such provisions must be subject to collective bargaining); Jan Ransom, Boston Slow to
Adopt Policing Innovations; Changes Stall as Unions Seek Role, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 5, 2016,
2016 WLNR 27007841 (reporting on a court battle between a Boston police union and Boston
Police Department management over the introduction of body cameras and whether rules
should be subject to collective bargaining); Harry Bruinius, Why Police Are Pushing Back on
Body Cameras, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30, 2016, 2016 WLNR 26450977 (detailing
lawsuits and debates involving police unions over the body camera issue); Brian Brus, Police
Union Complaint Halts Body-Cam Test Program, J. REC. (Okla. City), June 15, 2016, 2016
WLNR 18940773 (discussing how a lawsuit by an Oklahoma City police union put the City’s
body camera program on hold); Andrew Blake, Body Cameras Spark Lawsuit Between Denver
Cops, City Officials, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2015, 2015 WLNR 33002278 (discussing a lawsuit
by a Denver police union seeking collective bargaining over body camera rules).
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (describing the obligation to bargain collectively).
115 See, e.g., Editorial, Draft Body-Camera Policy Places Police Union’s Concerns Over
Public’s, OREGONIAN, June 24, 2016, at A16, 2016 WLNR 19464570 (discussing controversy
over the closed-door negotiations of a body camera policy between the mayor and the police
union that allegedly resulted in a dilution of accountability and transparency measures);
Max Schanzenbach, Union Contracts Key to Reducing Police Misconduct, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
24, 2015, at 17, 2015 WLNR 34864776 (discussing how unions have successfully used
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case of the Seattle Police Department’s policy regarding its body
camera pilot program, the influence of the union in securing
protections against discipline for not recording is transparently
described on the face of the policy:
The Memorandum of Agreement between the City of
Seattle and the Seattle Police Officers’ Guild outlines
the scope of the program. Pursuant to that agreement,
there will be no discipline that follows from not
recording a particular incident with BWV.116
When police department management designs a body camera
program and policy without union input, the entire program can
derail. For example, the Oklahoma City Department of Police had
to halt its body-worn camera program after an arbitrator ruled
that the rules regarding recording and review had to be negotiated
with the police union as part of a collective bargaining
agreement.117 The union supported body cameras to protect
against false accusations but wanted the power to help frame the
rules of recording and protections regarding supervisor review and
compliance audits.118 A central concern raised by the union was
the management’s policy allowing supervisors to review recordings

collective bargaining to resist body camera adoption by police departments and secure
“binding arbitration for any significant disciplinary action taken against officers—a system
stacked heavily in favor of police”).
116 SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICY MANUAL, BODY-WORN CAMERA PILOT PROGRAM,
POLICY 16.091 (effective Apr. 1, 2016). The current version of the Seattle Police Department’s
manual no longer includes the quoted language. Instead, the manual provides for particular
situations in which an officer will not be disciplined. For example, a failure to record
particularly sensitive or private interactions, such as interviews with victims of sexual
assault, will not subject the officer to discipline. See SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE
MANUAL, POLICY 16.090-POL 1 (effective July 19, 2017) [hereinafter SEATTLE PD MANUAL],
https://www.seattle.gov/policemanual/. Furthermore, upon departmental review of body
camera recordings, an officer will not be subject to discipline for “minor acts of misconduct
unrelated to the original reason for viewing the video” including use of profanity or rudeness.
See id. at POLICY 16.090-POL 2. Unlike the provision in the 2015 version of Seattle’s manual,
it is unclear from the policy itself whether the 2017 provisions were the result of collective
bargaining.
117 See Agreement Reached to Restart Police Department’s Body-Worn Camera Program,
US FED. NEWS, Nov. 29, 2016, WESTLAW.
118 See id.
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at any time.119 The union wanted a limit to prevent supervisors
from going on “a fishing expedition.”120
Concerns over supervisors using recordings to hunt for
violations and nickel-and-dime officers for minor issues is reflected
in the number of protections addressing those concerns.121
Philadelphia’s body camera policy explains the underlying
rationale:
To effectively perform their duties, Officers must have
a level of comfort in which minor disciplinary offenses
recorded while performing their duties that would not
otherwise become known but for wearing a Body-Worn
Camera, will not adversely affect an officer’s
career. . . .
Thus, the secondary purpose of this
directive is to provide officers with the knowledge that
“minor disciplinary code violations” that are captured
on any Body Worn Camera will not result in an official
Internal Affairs investigation . . . based solely upon
their minor infraction.122

The proposed draft of the New York body camera policy offers
examples of “nickel-and-diming” concerns, “such as chewing gum
or taking off a hat that the supervisor wouldn’t have otherwise
seen.”123 Beyond sweating the small stuff, the larger concern is
increased supervisor surveillance enabled by the availability of
records. For example, Saint Paul’s policy explicitly addresses the

119 See Sheldra Brigham, OKCPD Removes Body Cameras until Policy is in Place, KFOR
NEWS CHANNEL 4 (June 15, 2016, 7:14 PM), http://kfor.com/2016/06/15/okcpd-removes-bodycameras-until-policy-is-in-place/.
120 See id. (quoting union president John George, “We didn’t want supervisors just to be
able to go on a fishing expedition”).
121 See supra Part II.B & Table 4 (finding that 17% of major-city police department policies
involved limits on disciplinary use of recordings in cases of minor violations).
122 PHILA. PD, BWC DIR., supra note 26, § 2.B.
123 N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 10 (June 29, 2016)
[hereinafter NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER], https://policingproject.org/wp-consent/upload
s/2016/06/NYPD-BWC-Draft-Policy.pdf; see also SEATTLE PD MANUAL, supra note 116, at
POLICY 16.090-POL 2 (discussing examples of minor infractions, such as uniform infractions).

2017]

MISSING POLICE BODY CAMERA VIDEOS

87

issue, providing: “Supervisors may not access or review BWC
Data for the purpose of surveillance of any employee.”124
The omissions, gaps, and limits on review and discipline must
be viewed in the structural context of police departments and
labor’s concerns regarding management.
When a police
department announces a plan to adopt body cameras, that does not
mean that the officers who will actually be wearing the cameras
support the endeavor. For example, when the Boston Police
Department sought 100 volunteers to pilot the technology, not a
single person on the force of more than 2,000 sworn officers
volunteered.125 The department had to conscript the 100 testers,
whose union then sued, alleging labor law violations.126
Management has a delicate task securing buy-in from officers.127
Launching even a small pilot program is hard enough.128
Specifying consequences for noncompliance risks rousing
organized resistance that would altogether defeat the project.129
An external power may have more success in putting teeth into
recording policies—or providing cover to police management to do
so.130 It is noteworthy that the department in the sample with a
detailed scale of sanctions—and among the toughest sanctions—
for non-recording was the Denver Police Department.131 Since
2005, the Office of the Independent Monitor has served as a public
124 ST. PAUL POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA PILOT POLICY, POLICY 442.18 (issued Oct.
25, 2016, revised Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.stpaul.gov/books/44218-body-worn-camera-pi
lot-policy.
125 Editorial, Patience on ‘Pilot’, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 20, 2016, at 20, 2016 WLNR 38936566,
http://www.bostonherald.com/opinion/editorials/2016/12/editorial_patience_on_pilot.
126 Michael Levenson & Evan Allen, Boston Police Union Challenges Body Camera
Program, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 26 2016, 2016 WLNR 26144946 (“[W]hen no officers
volunteered to wear cameras, [the police commissioner] announced the department would
effectively force 100 officers to wear the devices. . . . The [police] union [subsequently] filed a
grievance . . . .”).
127 For numerous examples of the court battles with police unions over the introduction of
body cameras, see supra note 113.
128 See sources cited supra note 113.
129 See, e.g., Liam Dillon, Police Access Bills No Longer a Priority, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2017, at 1, 2017 WLNR 6287355 (discussing “steadfast” union opposition on discipline
issues and successful fights by police unions).
130 Cf. Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 336–37 (2015) (noting that in the legislative context “[a]n
external reviewer’s report might supply political cover for sympathetic but risk-averse
lawmakers to press for reform”).
131 See DENVER PD MANUAL, supra note 99, at POLICY 119.04, § 12.
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watchdog over the Denver Police Department.132 Created by
ordinance passed by the City Council in 2004, the Independent
Monitor has the power to monitor police conduct, investigate, and
recommend changes in practices.133 In 2014, following the Denver
Police Department’s pilot-test of police body cameras, the
Independent Monitor released a report finding that many uses of
force were not recorded on camera.134 The Independent Monitor
noted that the failure to inform officers of possible sanctions for
noncompliance may have contributed to the failures to record
despite policy mandates.135
Drafted subsequent to the Independent Monitor’s report,
Denver’s current body camera policy is now among the most
detailed and toughest on sanctions among all the available majorcity policies analyzed. Denver’s policy provides for an oral
reprimand, together with a mandated officer review of the body
camera policy, a follow-up meeting with a supervisor, and a
“[j]ournal entry” for a first violation in a 12-month period; a
written reprimand for a second violation in a 12-month period; and
“1 fined day” for the third violation in a 12-month period.136 In
addition, upon a second violation, the officer is subject to “an indepth audit of the officer’s data usage” and the resulting
documentation goes to the Professional Standards Unit, which
“will generate a formal Personal Assessment System (PAS)
review.”137 In addition to this scale of penalties, the policy
cautions that “[p]urposeful, flagrant or repeated violations will

132 See OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, COMPLAINT MONITORING GUIDELINES: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1 (2010), https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/374/docume
nts/OIM_Case_Handling_Guidelines_Final_Executive_Summary_8_1_10.pdf (“In 2005, in
an effort to improve police accountability to the public, the City of Denver created the Office
of the Independent Monitor (OIM) . . . to monitor and report on the handling of citizen
complaints by the Denver Police and Sheriff Departments.”).
133 DENVER, COLO., REV. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 2, art. XVII, § 2371.
See also Noelle
Phillips, Move to Strengthen Denver’s Independent Monitor Advances, DENVER POST (Feb. 3,
2015, 9:57 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/02/03/move-to-strengthen-denvers-indepe
ndent-monitor-advances/ (discussing a dispute between the Monitor and the Denver Police
Department over whether the Department is obligated to grant full access to body camera
footage for the Monitor).
134 See discussion supra at notes 60–65.
135 See DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT, supra note 44, at 30.
136 DENVER PD MANUAL, supra note 99, at POLICY 119.04, § 12.
137 Id.
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result in more severe disciplinary action.”138 These tough and
detailed provisions contrast sharply with the majority approach of
simply not addressing the consequences for noncompliance with
recording directives.139
B. PARSING BETWEEN LEGITIMATE CHALLENGES AND SUBVERSION

Another important reason for the widespread omissions
regarding consequences for failures to record is the difficulty of
distinguishing legitimate from culpable conduct. The commentary
to the New York Police Department’s draft body camera policy
openly acknowledges that sanctions are unspecified because of the
difficulties: “Officer discipline is generally not mentioned in the
proposed policy. It is difficult to specify a discipline system as
there are many variables that determine whether or not an officer
should face discipline in [a] specific instance.”140 As the drafters of
the New York policy frankly address, silence regarding whether
sanctions will occur is no oversight. It is easier to leave things
unspecified because there are good reasons not to record. Two of
the major and commonly occurring justifications for failures to
record are the need to respond to exigencies in the field and
technological malfunction. As discussed below, parsing between
these important and legitimate justifications and refusal,
resistance, and subversion is a delicate and difficult task.
1. Forgot in the Heat of the Moment, or Refused to Record? In
the cool and safe remove of hindsight, it is all too easy to question
and condemn imperfect adherence, especially after a tragedy.141
But in the heat and fray of the field there are legitimate reasons
why recording fails.142 Officers focused on the immediate need to
respond to the exigencies of fast-unfolding and high-stress events

Id.
See supra Table 4.
140 NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS ORDER, supra note 123, at 10.
141 Indeed, “we tend to be historical simplifiers, even reducers, who often skate over the
relevant facts in order to lay the blame somewhere rather than everywhere or nowhere.”
MARK FREEMAN, HINDSIGHT: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF LOOKING BACKWARD 40 (2010).
142 See discussion infra at notes 143–44, 152–57. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001) (explaining that police officers frequently have to act “on the spur
(and in the heat) of the moment”).
138
139
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may forget to hit record, or lack the time to do so.143 Among body
camera policies, there is wide and express acceptance of the basic
proposition that safety trumps the recording obligation in body
camera policies.144
Inexperience with implementing new recording requirements
can further lead to failures to record in stressful situations.145
Mistakes happen. There is a learning curve with new technologies
and procedures.146 The lack of a clear and calibrated scale of
sanctions can even potentially end up underprotecting officers who
face high-stress circumstances and a new recording regime. For
example, if a tragedy happens on an officer’s watch, and the
incident hits the headlines, there is a risk of swift and severe
sanctions in response to the attention, since no specified scale is

143 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (“In a kaleidoscopic
situation[,] . . . spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the
order of the day . . . .”).
144 See, e.g., CORPUS CHRISTI POLICE DEP’T, MOBILE DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDING SYSTEMS
AND BODY WORN CAMERAS, POLICY 303, at 7 (May 10, 2016) (on file with author) (“At no time
is a member expected to jeopardize his/her safety in order to activate a BWC or change the
recording media.”); MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, POLICY
747.25 (effective July 15, 2016), http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/mpdAuthors/
SOP/747-BODYWORNCAMERABWC1.pdf (“The department recognizes that officer safety is
paramount. Members with BWC who arrive on a scene or engage in an enforcement contact
must start recording as soon as it is safe and practical to do so.”); NYPD, DRAFT OPERATIONS
ORDER, supra note 123, at 3 (“If the circumstances require a[ ] [uniform member of the service]
to engage immediate safety measures first, the [uniformed member] should do so and then
activate the BWC as soon as it is practical and safe. At no point should proper tactics be
compromised to begin a recording.”); SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP’T, AXON BODY WORN CAMERAS,
PROCEDURE, PROCEDURE 1.49, at 2 (effective July 20, 2016) [hereinafter SAN JOSE PD, BWC
POLICY], https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/ 149.pdf (“Officer safety and public safety
take precedence over recording events. . . . Officer safety and the safety of the public shall be
the primary considerations when contacting citizens or conducting vehicle stops, not the
ability to record an event.”); SAN JOSE POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA POLICY, at 2
(effective July 29, 2015), http://www.sjpd.org/InsideSJPD/BodyCameras/SJPD_BWC_Policy_0
6-29-15_with_POA_approval.pdf (“The safety of officers and members of the public is the
highest priority, and the Department acknowledges there may be situations in which
operation of the device is impractical or may be an impediment to public and officer safety.
Additionally, the Department recognizes human performance limitations during particularly
stressful, critical situations.”).
145 See Sweeney & Gorner, supra note 5 (reporting findings of a preliminary investigation
that officers’ inexperience with operating body cameras led to a failure to record the police
shooting of Paul O’Neal).
146 See, e.g., SAN DIEGO PD, BWC POLICY, supra note 144, at 1 (“There is also a learning
curve that comes with using body-worn cameras.”).
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set.147 Under the hot scrutiny of public attention after a tragedy,
as people search for a villain to blame, officers’ claims about
mistakes and exigencies may face withering skepticism.148
Yet the very import and power of the safety and high-stress
justification creates the risk of it becoming a blanket and
standard-form invocation. This is a particularly acute risk in the
cases that do not make the national news—the tasings, the pepper
sprays, and the baton strikes that go unrecorded and without a
fatality to draw media attention.149 For example, the Independent
Monitor for the Denver Police Department observed that, in a
number of unrecorded uses of force, the “officers asserted that the
situations evolved too rapidly or were too volatile to permit BWC
activation, even though it was the officers who initiated the
contacts without first activating their BWCs, as required.”150
Parsing between these legitimate realities and circumvention, or
just outright refusal to activate the body camera, calls for expert
judgment and inference when confronted with uncertainties.
2. Technological Malfunction or Circumvention? Technological
solutions are alluring because they seem to free us from human
fallibility.151 Yet, as anyone who has pounded multiple keys of a
frozen laptop or had a cell phone die knows, technology has its own
147 Cf., e.g., Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 805 (2002) (discussing how penalties that are clearly
articulated in advance protect against the risk of more severe penalties); Elizabeth Szockyj,
Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 492–93 (1999) (discussing the
role of media attention in raising the probability of punishment in the white-collar crime
context).
148 See Thomas E. Drabek & Enrico L. Quarantelli, Scapegoats, Villains, and Disasters, 4
TRANS-ACTION 12, 12–16 (1967) (discussing the phenomenon of public scapegoating and
villain-seeking after tragedies).
149 See discussion, supra notes 62–65.
150 DENVER INDEP. MONITOR 2014 REPORT, supra note 44, at 20.
151 The greater freedom from human fallibility that technology affords has spurred
excitement and innovation in diverse quarters. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the
Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2008) (discussing
technological advances in response to fallible human memory which would “enable
unprecedented accurate retention and recall”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing:
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 199, 221–23 (2007) (discussing
technological advances in automated law enforcement programs). This allure can be
misleading, however, compelling courts to adopt safety measures to prevent misleading
jurors. See, e.g., Reese v. Stroh, 874 P.2d 200, 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
standards for the admission of evidence which were “adopted to prevent the use
of . . . technologies that, because they are mechanical or mysterious, appear infallible to the
average juror”).
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particular and manifold fallibilities. Batteries die, devices freeze,
fall, or otherwise fail.152 In the early days of dash cameras,
departments who adopted the then-new and enticing technology
soon discovered the many ways cameras and technology can
deliver glitches.153
Accounts of malfunctioning body cameras are already
emerging.154 Halfway into a six-month pilot program, the Boston
Police Department experienced seventy-two recording failures
with their body cameras.155 The Department attributed those
failures to “technical malfunctions includ[ing] insufficient battery
life, cameras falling off their mounts, or shutting off without
explanation.”156 Clearly it would be unjust to punish officers for
the fallibilities of technology, particularly when performing under
high-stress, suboptimal field conditions. Yet parsing between the
vulnerabilities of technology and the subversion of resistant
officers can be tough.
Consider, for example, the claims by two Baton Rouge police
officers that both their body cameras fell off during the tragic
shooting of Alton Sterling.157 Sterling was selling CDs outside a
convenience store when a homeless man persistently sought

See discussion infra notes 154–56.
See Tom Casady, Hidden Cost of Body-Worn Cameras, DIRECTOR’S DESK (Oct. 31, 2014,
6:12 AM), http://lpd304.blogspot.com/2014/10/hidden-cost-of-body-worn-cameras.html
(discussing frequent technological malfunctions in the early days of dash camera adoption).
154 See, e.g., Adam Randall, Norman Gary Family Hoping for Indictment in Grand Jury’s
First Day, GOSHEN NEWS (Goshen, Ind.), Feb. 28, 2017, 2017 WLNR 6249535 (discussing
police department reports of widespread body camera malfunctions one of which resulted in
a failure to record a fatal shooting); Bob Blake, Family of Man Shot and Killed Files Civil
Rights Lawsuit Against Elkhart Police Officers, S. BEND TRIB. (Ind.), Jan. 25, 2017, 2017
WLNR 2549264 (chronicling controversies over body camera malfunctions and suspension
of a body camera program, due to frequent technical problems); Samantha Vicent,
Tahlequah Police Release Video from Officer-Involved Fatal Shooting, TULSA WORLD
(Okla.), Aug. 20, 2016, 2016 WLNR 25518803 (discussing body camera malfunction and
memory capacity problems); Greg Moran, Officer’s Statements Conflict on Weapon, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2015, at 3, 2015 WLNR 38209020 (reporting on officer’s claim that body
camera was not working at the time of a shooting and “it had been malfunctioning for
several weeks”).
155 Brian Dowling & Owen Boss, Critics Slam Cop Body Cams on the Link, BOS. HERALD,
Dec. 19, 2016, at 2, 2016 WLNR 38826283.
156 Id.
157 See Kelly et al., supra note 3.
152
153
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money from him.158 Finally, Sterling said, “I told you to leave me
alone,” and showed the panhandler his gun.159 The homeless man
then called 911 on his cell phone, telling police there was a man
with a gun at the store.160 What happened next was captured on
the cell phone camera of a bystander and a store camera but the
officers’ body cameras failed to obtain usable footage of the
incident.161
Experts disagree on the likelihood that both cameras were
dislodged around the same time.162 Some opined for the media
that it would be highly unlikely for two cameras to both fall off at
the same time-critical juncture.163 Yet others said it could happen
and, in fact, it has happened before.164 Tod Burke, a professor of
criminal justice and former police officer, argued that the highly
unusual scenario would be for two officers to collude to prevent the
recording of an incident whilst in the middle of a high-stress
situation.165 The battle of the experts that played out in the media
demonstrates how potentially time- and resource-consuming it
would be to parse between officer subversion and technological
malfunction in determining whether discipline is justified or not.

158 See Joshua Berlinger et al., Alton Sterling Shooting: Homeless Man Made 911 Call,
Source Says, CNN (July 8, 2016, 7:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/us/baton-rougealton-sterling-shooting/.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.; Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice
Dept. Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/alto
n-sterling-baton-rouge-shooting.html.
162 See Frumin, supra note 3 (“Critics say [the officers’] explanation is awfully
convenient—and arguably untrue.”).
163 See, e.g., id. (quoting Steve Tuttle, a spokesman for Taser, “[i]t’s not unheard of, but it’s
very unusual in the overall industry and certainly isn’t a significant issue for us despite
seven years of our cameras being worn by more than 3,500 law enforcement agencies”).
164 See id. (quoting law enforcement officials as stating that “it is entirely possible that
both cameras could have fallen off,” and reporting that the Salt Lake City Police
Department had “seen it happen when two officers are engaged with a person”).
165 See id. (“It would have been a very, very unusual circumstance where both officers
would have to say let’s turn it off and throw our body cameras away. Everything seemed to
happen relatively quickly.”).
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IV. JUDICIAL PRETRIAL REMEDIES FROM AN EVIDENTIARY
FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE
Given the internal enforcement challenges and the reporting
and incentives gaps in departmental recording policies, judicial
remedies are especially important. Courts have long been the
most critical external actor in regulating police power.166 Courts
are also the seasoned gatekeepers of evidence.167 This dual judicial
role and level of expertise are important for addressing the
missing video problem.
The challenge is how to frame
administrable remedies that reduce the risk of perverse
consequences posed by costly inquests into whether individual
officers are to blame for missing video.168 This section proposes
adopting an evidentiary fairness approach that does not depend on
messy and costly culpability assessments and offers three
remedies designed from such a perspective.
A. THE ADVANTAGES OF MAKING CULPABILITY IRRELEVANT

Defendants do not fare well when they have to show bad faith
on the part of the government for missing evidence.169 This is an
approach with a low probability of success for at least three main
reasons. First, officers are unlikely to say they acted in bad faith
and, in defendant-said, police-said credibility contests, officers are
more likely to be believed.170 Second, courts are reluctant to find
166 See Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court’s Regulatory Revolution in Criminal Procedure, 43
CONN. L. REV. 1, 48–76 (2010) (chronicling the rise of courts’ central role in regulating the
police); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2471–2503 (1996) (discussing the central
role of courts in framing conduct rules for the police).
167 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 147 (1999) (discussing the
courts’ central gatekeeper role on evidentiary issues); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2001) (“[J]udges are central and active figures in
admissibility decision-making . . . .”).
168 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding the
defendant failed to show bad faith on the part of the government in destroying video
evidence); United States v. Valentin, 2016 WL 1296854, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2016)
(ruling the defendant failed to show that the missing video was as a result of bad faith on
the part of the government); Burks v. Howes, No. 08-12825-BC, 2010 WL 2772432, at *4
(E.D. Mich. July 13, 2010) (same).
170 See discussion infra notes 173–79.
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that officers are “testilying,” even when they suspect this may be
the case.171 Lastly, courts are reluctant to engage in costly minitrials on collateral evidentiary issues.172
As a systemic matter in criminal justice, credibility contests
between defense allegations and police testimony are highly
Absent additional evidence beyond
uneven and messy.173
competing testimony, stories can diverge widely, with each side
accusing the other of lying rather than merely mistaken.174
Defendants often allege that the police abused their power and
perjured themselves to hide their civil rights violations.175 The
police say the defendant is lying to avoid and subvert just
punishment.176
The playing field in this ugly battle is highly imbalanced. To
preserve their Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent and
reduce the risk of generating impeachment material, defendants
have strong incentives to remain silent rather than testify, even at
pretrial motion hearings.177 This renders claims proffered in
motions seem all the more unsubstantiated.
Furthermore,
defendants are viewed as having a severe credibility problem—

See discussion infra notes 180–82.
See discussion infra notes 183–86.
173 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 913–20 (discussing the one-sidedness
and ugliness of credibility contests).
174 See id.
175 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sparks, 746 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Mass. 2001) (noting
defendant’s allegations that police planted a knife in defendant’s bedroom during the
execution of a search warrant); State v. Pogue, 17 P.3d 1272, 1273 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting “[defendant’s] insinuation that the police planted the drugs”); People v. McGirt, 603
N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (noting defendant’s allegations that “the
police . . . planted evidence on him”); cf. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Three Former
Atlanta Police Officers Sentenced to Prison in Fatal Shooting of Elderly Atlanta Woman
(Feb. 24, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-atlanta-police-officers-sentence
d-prison-fatal-shooting-elderly-atlanta-woman (quoting U.S. Attorney David E. Nahmias,
“As Atlanta police narcotics officers, these three defendants repeatedly failed to follow
proper procedures and then lied under oath to obtain search warrants. Their routine
violations of the Fourth Amendment led to the death of an innocent citizen.”).
176 See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1665, 1695 (1987) (discussing the credibility deficit defendants face).
177 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1449–50 (2005) (explaining that defendants are “encouraged to be quiet”
through the criminal process).
171
172
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after all, they are charged with a crime.178
Historically,
defendants were not even deemed qualified to testify under
oath.179
Moreover, judges are highly reluctant to openly discredit the
testimony of law enforcement officers.180 Even when judges find
an officer’s account questionable, the judge is keenly aware that an
adverse finding suggesting that the officer is a liar can destroy the
officer’s career.181 In a criminal justice system where judges are
likely to see regularly officers from the jurisdiction’s agency in
court and in chambers—and perhaps even need law enforcement
endorsements to get re-elected—there are powerful systemic
pressures against discrediting officers.182
Finally, courts are also reluctant to engage in costly collateral
mini-trials on evidentiary questions.183 In the context of recording
technology, when the proffered reason may be technological
malfunction, such inquests would be even more costly, perhaps
178 See Dripps, supra note 176, at 1695 (asserting that a criminal charge imposes a powerful
incentive to offer exculpatory (and often perjured) testimony and “[b]ecause of this incentive,
the trier of fact is likely to discount any exculpatory testimony given by the accused”).
179 See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000) (citing 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579
(3d ed. 1940)) (noting eighteenth-century courts did not consider a defendant’s testimony at
trial to be evidence, “since they were disqualified from testifying under oath”).
180 See Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341,
1352 (1996) (quoting THE N.Y.C. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE CITY’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES, COMMISSION REPORT 36
(1994) (on file with the Georgia Law Review)) (“On the word of a police officer alone a grand
jury may indict, a trial jury may convict, and a judge pass sentence.”); Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1047–48 &
n.51 (1996) (suggesting that some judges might ignore perjury to achieve what the judge
considers to be justice under the given circumstances of the case).
181 Slobogin, supra note 180, at 1045 (noting that, although “judges believe perjury is
systematic,” they are rarely sure enough that it is occurring to expose a police officer to
criminal charges).
182 See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L. REV.
1391, 1391 (2001) (discussing law enforcement endorsements in judicial elections).
183 See, e.g., United States v. Hurst, 185 F. App’x 133, 136–37 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing
evidentiary rules that serve to avoid mini-trials on collateral matters); United States v.
Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing courts’ reluctance to engage in collateral
mini-trials on an officer’s past traffic stops, as “[f]ocusing on such collateral matters would
unduly encumber the court’s proceedings”); United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1156
n.5 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court’s decision to avoid collateral mini-trials in which
the defense and the government would offer different characterizations); United States v.
Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1992) (discussing and affirming the lower court’s refusal to
engage in collateral mini-trials in which each side would compete to characterize the relevant
events differently).
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entailing a battle of the experts regarding the probability of the
occurrence of such a malfunction.184 Remedies for missing videos
predicated on the blameworthiness of individual officers would
open the door to such messy and costly inquiries.
If remedies for missing video hinge on culpable officer conduct,
the risk of deterring a judicial inquiry is high. By judicial-inquiry
deterrence, I mean the avoidance of finding a colorable claim of a
violation, to avoid the mess and costs of wading into credibility
contests, collateral mini-trials, and potentially finding an officer
guilty of perjury or wrongdoing. Scholars have used the concept of
remedial deterrence to refer to judicial avoidance of finding a
violation to avoid the costs of offering a remedy.185 Judicialinquiry deterrence as framed here operates even earlier, leading to
curt dismissals of defense claims without significant inquiry.186
Rather than individuating blame on officers for missing
evidence, the focus of judicial remedies should be from a systemic
perspective on evidentiary fairness. This perspective elevates
courts out of the murky morass of individual blame—is this
particular officer lying about the camera falling off or is the
defendant lying? Instead, the evidentiary fairness approach from
a systemic perspective frames the problem thus: Key contested
aspects of this encounter were not recorded even though, pursuant
to the department’s policies, they are usually recorded. To address
this, remedies would focus on system integrity, including the
underlying imbalances in evidentiary advantages between the
police and the defendant, rather than trying to assign blame and
guess who is lying and who is not.

See discussion supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 759–60 (2008) (discussing remedial deterrence
in the international criminal context).
186 See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 373 F. App’x 386, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the government’s destruction of video
evidence warranted the remedy of a dismissal); United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1452
(10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss in a
case where a state trooper erased a video recording which may have held exculpatory
evidence).
184
185
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B. PRETRIAL REMEDIES BASED ON EVIDENTIARY FAIRNESS

An evidentiary fairness approach from a systemic perspective
can inform the choice of remedies for missing video. This section
proposes three potential remedies. To capture the bulk of criminal
cases, which never make it to trial, the focus here is on pretrial
remedies. The three proposals are: (1) exclusion of partial
recordings; (2) positive inferences to counteract the tendency to
discredit the defendant; and (3) using institutional awareness of
systemic facts to detect patterns of missing recordings. Each
proposed remedy is discussed below.
1. Exclusion of Partial Recordings. Regardless of whether the
officer was at fault for the missing video, courts can offer the
remedy of excluding partial video where recording rules require
recording the entire encounter.
This approach is not
unprecedented.187 In United States v. Yevakpor, a New York
district court excluded portions of a surveillance tape that the
government sought to introduce because other portions were
automatically recorded over and not preserved.188 The clips the
government preserved showed the defendant carrying a suitcase
with heroin at the New York Port of Entry and the search of the
suitcase by officers.189 The court construed the defendant’s motion
to exclude the clips as an invocation of Federal Rule of Evidence
106’s partial codification of the Doctrine of Completeness.190
Rule 106 provides that where a party introduces a recorded
statement, or a part of one, “an adverse party may require the
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing
or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be at the same
time.”191 The problem with partial video, of course, is that there is
no other portion the adverse party can introduce. In Yevakpor, the
court creatively addressed this problem outside the four corners of

187 See United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (excluding partial
government surveillance tape).
188 The recording system recorded over stored images “every 6 to 7 days.” Id. at 244, 247,
252.
189 Id. at 243–45.
190 Id. at 246–46.
191 FED. R. EVID. 106.
The 2006 version of Rule 106 used in Yevakpor was worded
differently, but its meaning was essentially the same.
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the classic Rule 106 situation.192 The court noted that it did “not
doubt the U.S. Attorney’s good faith” but that, regarding the
routine destruction of the rest of the video, partial video recordings
are akin to still photographs and thus pose a greater risk of scenes
being taken out of context than the “continuous stream of
information” that a complete video can provide.193 The court
agreed with the defense that interpretation of the clips would be
skewed by the lack of presentation in full context.194 Performing
its own “pragmatic balancing test,” the court excluded the clips as
“more prejudicial than probative.”195
Moreover, the court put the government on notice:
[I]f selected segments of a video or audio exhibit will
be offered at trial, the entire video or audio exhibit had
best be preserved . . . . Given the current state of
affairs in our nation, when surveillance occurs both
with and without our knowledge, a great danger to
liberty would exist if Government could pick and
choose segments of recordings for use in prosecution,
destroy the remainder, and then argue that the
defense must show that the destroyed evidence
contained exculpatory or otherwise potentially useful
and relevant information.
Simply put, the
Government cannot make use of video segments that
have been “cherry-picked” when the remainder of the
recording has been erased or recorded-over.196
From a seemingly mundane drug-smuggling case at a port of
entry, the court discerned the larger values at stake and the need
to fashion a remedy that applied regardless of proof by the defense
that the missing video was exculpatory or that the government
acted in bad faith. From an evidentiary fairness perspective, even
if a recording is incomplete due to no fault of the officer, there are
still important concerns about its admission. Video evidence has a

192
193
194
195
196

Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246–47.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250–52.
Id. at 252 (citation omitted).
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dangerous power to seem to offer the viewer the ability to see for
him or herself what really happened.197 Yet the vantage point of
the camera and what it catches and misses can tell a misleading
story.198
We do not know whether something crucial that would put
conduct in context is cut out. Seeing only part of the action
without key context can lead viewers to draw the wrong
inferences.199 For example, is a suspect apparently behaving
belligerently toward an officer on video doing so because he was
aggressive from the beginning of the encounter, or because the
officer was demeaning or threatening first? Was the suspect
acting suspiciously from the start of a Terry stop, or does he only
look suspicious once the camera turns on and displays the
contraband which was found on the suspect during a stop and
frisk? The partial recording might be a selective presentation—or
it might be due to mistake, technological malfunction, or exigency.
Rather than adjudicating officer fault, however, the court could
exclude the partial video as a matter of evidentiary fairness so the
prosecution does not have the advantage of a partial—and
potentially misleading—video.
2. Favorable Inferences. What happens if video is missing
altogether? The Supreme Court has held that it is a due process
violation for the government to fail to preserve evidence that is
exculpatory to the defendant.200 If the defendant cannot show the
destroyed evidence was exculpatory, and “no more can be said
than that it . . . might have exonerated the defendant,” then the
criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the
police.201 This body of law is unavailing in the failure to record

197 See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 8 (2009) (stating that videos can
be “highly credible evidence of the reality they depict,” and that they are more readily
believed than words); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright,
125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 692 & n.29 (2012) (arguing that images are often more persuasive
than other forms of knowledge, even having the power to overcome personal memories of an
event; but the meaning of those images always comes from interpretation).
198 See Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 25, at 947–52 (discussing the particular
perspective of body-worn cameras and the point-of-view bias that can result).
199 See, for example, Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246, where the court was concerned
that a partial recording presents an increased risk that scenes may be taken out of context.
200 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988).
201 Id. at 56–58.
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context for three reasons. First, the evidence was not destroyed.
Rather it was never created. Second, if the evidence was never
created, it is hard for the defendant to prove that it might be
exculpatory.202 Third, bad faith is hard to prove because the
officers will rarely say they were acting with bad intent and are
likely to proffer alternative rationales, which courts are reluctant
to suggest are false.203
It may be tempting to try to draw an analogy with spoliation
doctrine, which also concerns remedies for missing evidence.
Spoliation means the destruction of evidence or failure to preserve
it for reasonably foreseeable litigation.204 More fundamentally, the
doctrine is about the “inherent power of the courts . . . to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process in order to retain confidence
that the process works to uncover the truth.”205 To sanction
spoliation, courts may infer that the information would have been
adverse to the party.206 Many courts require a showing of
intentional destruction in bad faith before imposing an adverseinference sanction.207 Others hold that bad faith is not required
202 Cf. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (“This is a harsh standard to apply considering
that the Defendant cannot know what missing portions would be relevant” since the video
no longer exists).
203 See discussion supra notes 180–82.
204 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
205 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001).
206 See id. at 592–93 (affirming the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, where the
failure to preserve a motor vehicle in its “post-accident condition” “highly prejudiced”
defendant).
207 See, e.g., Guzman v. Jones, 804 F.3d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We permit an adverse
inference against the spoliator or sanctions against the spoliator only upon a showing of
‘bad faith’ or ‘bad conduct’ . . . Bad faith, in the context of spoliation, generally means
destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse evidence.”); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley,
703 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2013) (ruling that the district court must find bad faith and
prejudice in order to give an adverse-inference instruction); Bull v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 79 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing the “pivotal” role of bad faith in sanctionable
spoliation); Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2010)
(requiring the party seeking an adverse inference to “demonstrate that the defendants
intentionally destroyed the documents in bad faith,” explaining “[t]he crucial element in a
spoliation claim is not the fact that documents were destroyed but that they were destroyed
for the purpose of hiding adverse information”); Turner v. Public Serv. Co., 563 F.3d 1136,
1149 (10th Cir. 2009) (“But if the aggrieved party seeks an adverse inference to remedy the
spoliation, it must also prove bad faith.”); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir.
1997) (“In this circuit, an adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to preserve
evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.”); see also 89
C.J.S. Trial § 671 (2017) (“The jury should be given an adverse-inference instruction on
spoliation of evidence if the requesting party makes a threshold showing that the opposing
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and instead use other criteria, such as willful conduct or notice
that the evidence was potentially relevant to the litigation.208
Civil rights plaintiffs attempting to allege spoliation based on a
recording omission or destruction have failed because of an
inability to show bad faith and the availability of other
explanations, such as officer inexperience.209 Classic spoliation
doctrine is even more difficult to apply in the context of an officer’s
decision not to record altogether. The failure to record is a
particularly ambiguous context because evidence was not
destroyed. Rather it never existed. Culpable bad faith—acting
with the purpose of destroying evidence to hide adverse
information210—is even harder to allege because of the legitimate
reasons officers may proffer for not recording in the field.211 The
remedy would be merely theoretical rather than attainable
because of the difficulty of demonstrating that a video that never
existed would have contained adverse information.212 While some
party improperly caused the loss of the evidence.”); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 256 (“[T]he
intentional spoliation . . . of evidence relevant to a case raises . . . an inference[ ] that this
evidence would have been unfavorable. . . . The inference does not arise where the
destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.”).
208 See, e.g., Grosdidier v. Broadcasting Bd. of Governors, 709 F.3d 19, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(ruling that a showing of bad faith is not required); Hodge v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 360
F.3d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that bad faith is not always necessary for
sanctionable spoliation and willful conduct suffices); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d
93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a spoliation claim can be based on a violation of
regulatory duty to keep records if the records “were destroyed with a culpable state of mind
(i.e. where, for example, the records were destroyed knowingly, even if without intent to
violate the regulation, or negligently)” and “the destroyed records were relevant to the
party’s claim or defense”); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329–30 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that bad faith is not required and notice that evidence is relevant to the litigation
and failure to preserve suffice).
209 See, e.g., Victor v. Lawler, 520 F. App’x 103, 105–06 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curium)
(holding that the officer failed to record due to inexperience and not bad faith). Cf., e.g.,
Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the civil rights plaintiff
failed to show bad faith on the part of prison guards who did not preserve video recordings
of an incident).
210 See Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155 (7th Cir. 1998) (defining
“bad faith” as “destruction for the purpose of hiding adverse information”).
211 See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the possible legitimate reasons for a failure
to record an incident, including technical malfunctions and either forgetting or not having
time to “hit record” during the heat of a particularly stressful encounter).
212 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 n.6 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting
that officer intent is rarely openly revealed); United States v. Martinez, No. 11-10195-RWZ,
2013 WL 49767, at *6–7 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding no bad faith when the government failed
to preserve videos the defendant claimed might have contained exculpatory information).
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courts do not require a showing of bad faith for an adverse
inference, many do because of “the gravity of an adverse inference
instruction, which ‘brands one party as a bad actor.’ ”213
To surmount this dilemma, this Article proposes a positive
inference when video of a law enforcement encounter that should
be recorded is missing.
This positive rather than adverse,
inference could apply regardless of the culpability of the officer in
the failure to record. The positive inference would be that the
missing video could have information that supports the defense.
This positive framing spares the culpability connotations of an
adverse inference that video is missing because the officer knew he
had something to hide.
Rather than an adverse inference
branding a party as a “bad actor” in destroying evidence, a
favorable inference is a credibility-reinforcing move.
It
counteracts the systemic imbalance in credibility capital that
defendants face in the criminal justice system.214 It puts a thumb
on the scale of inferences in favor of the defendant without
necessitating a finding that recording was subverted to hide
damaging evidence. A recording could be missing for wholly
legitimate reasons and yet still contain information that could
support the defense.
3.
Pattern and Practice Detection.
Finally, a systemic
perspective also widens the horizon of remedies beyond the
individual case level to a systemic level. This proposal draws on
Andrew Crespo’s important call for courts to use their privileged
access to systemic facts to advance beyond transactional myopia in
Transactional myopia refers to the
criminal procedure.215
tendency to focus on the specific facts in a particular criminal
procedure case before the court.216 Systemic facts refers to the
Cf. Bracey, 712 F.3d at 1019 (“Without having seen the video, no prison official could have
known the tapes potentially contained adverse information and, without that knowledge,
could have destroyed the tapes for the purpose of hiding adverse information.”).
213 See, e.g., Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Morris v. Union Pac. R.R., 373 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2004)). See also supra note 207 for
numerous examples of courts requiring a showing of bad faith before sanctioning a party
with an adverse inference.
214 See discussion supra notes 173–82 (discussing the “severe credibility problem” defendants
face).
215 Crespo, supra note 36.
216 See id. at 2057 (explaining that “constitutional criminal adjudication . . . is largely
transactional in nature, focusing on the ‘one-off interaction typified by the singular’ search,
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larger pattern of data that courts can detect and interpret based
on information acquired over time by processing many criminal
procedure cases.217
Courts have amassed a valuable trove of systemic facts in their
filing cabinets, online data systems, and transcripts.218 This can
help courts more accurately detect systemic problems and
adjudicate between competing claims. For example, in justifying a
search or seizure, do the police always use standard-form
boilerplate language?219 How likely is it for warrants issued based
on such boilerplate recitations to yield the evidence sought?220 A
word search using high-speed software through digitized search
warrant affidavits and inventories can detect such a pattern.221
A defendant in a particular case alleging that crucial video
footage is missing may just seem to be an isolated case, or give the
impression of grasping at straws to create a defense. But highspeed searches of motions filed over time can detect patterns in
alleged missing evidence. Do the claims tend to involve the same
law enforcement agency unit, or even the same officers? Do the
claims cluster around particular kinds of cases or neighborhoods,
potentially unveiling an off-the-books tactic in a particular kind of
investigation or among a particular team? This form of judicial
audit can supplement internal departmental enforcement
mechanisms. Detection of problematic patterns can inform judges
if they need to start stepping up scrutiny—and whether wading
into the morass of fault for missing video is warranted.

seizure or prosecution of ‘a particular suspect for a specific crime’ ” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1039, 1039 (2016)).
217 See id. at 2066–68 (describing systemic facts as “information with respect to which a
given decisionmaking institution enjoys deep institutional familiarity, privileged (or
perhaps even exclusive) access, or both”).
218 See, e.g., id. at 2072–75 (describing the Superior Court of the District of Columbia’s
catalogued and digitized information on probable-cause documentation, including written
affidavits and hearing transcripts).
219 See id. at 2074–85 (providing examples of “routine factual representations,” such as
“high-crime areas”).
220 See id. at 2085 (reporting that searches sanctioned by warrants obtained through the
use of “probable-cause scripts” more often than not fail to yield the evidence sought, using
firearms (91% failure rate) and drugs (66% failure rate) as examples).
221 See id. at 2074, 2082–85 (explaining how cumulative information can be used by courts
to assess the descriptive and predictive accuracy of probable-cause scripts).
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V. CONCLUSION: AUTOMATIC CAMERA ACTIVATION
On paper, a revolution in police regulation by recording seems
to be sweeping the world of law enforcement, as departments
around the nation adopt body camera recording mandates in
response to calls for reform. On the ground, however, problems
with nonrecording or recording after the crucial moment are
emerging. Controversies over missing video are raising important
questions about how to enforce recording requirements and protect
system integrity against partial or missing videos.
Internal departmental enforcement of recording rules is
challenging because of the individual fault-based nature of
disciplinary processes as well as the management-labor
negotiations and protections. Courts are better institutionally
situated to ensure a fair and accurate video evidentiary record.
The challenge is determining what remedies to offer when video
that should be available under departmental recording rules is
missing. Remedies requiring a showing of bad faith on the part of
the officers are illusory. The blame approach is predetermined to
fail because of the reluctance of courts to find that officers are
perjurers; to wade into costly mini-trials on collateral evidentiary
issues; and to second-guess the judgment calls of officers in the
heat and stress of the field. Remedies contingent on finding
culpability are likely to lead to judicial-inquiry deterrence, in
which courts dismiss claims regarding missing video with little or
no inquiry because of the costs of parsing officer fault.
This Article proposes an evidentiary fairness approach that
avoids wading into the messy morass of individual blame. Under
this approach, partial recordings should be excluded because of the
tendency to mislead rather than as a sanction based on a finding of
officer wrongdoing.
Where video is missing altogether, an
inference that the video could contain information favorable to the
defense should be drawn. This contrasts with spoliation doctrine,
which often requires a showing of bad faith before imposing the
adverse inference that a party destroyed or failed to preserve
evidence because it was favorable to the other party.
Furthermore, courts can use their repository of motions and other
documents or information regarding missing video to detect
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potentially problematic systemic patterns that warrant heightened
scrutiny—and can perhaps even wade into the morass of fault.
Beyond any stop-gap remedies for missing video, the optimal
approach ultimately is to prevent the problem from arising by
automating recording.222 Rather than expecting officers acting in
the heat and stress of unfolding situations to remember to record,
technology can activate recording upon pre-determined triggers
such as motion, sounds, physiological indicators, or activation of
sirens. Companies are beginning to offer automatic recording
solutions that rely on triggers such as the boom of a gunshot; the
drawing of a gun or Taser; exceeding a certain speed; the opening
of a door; the activation of sirens; entering a geo-fenced area
designated “high-crime”; or indicators of an officer’s physiological
stress.223 Currently available technology can even automatically
activate the body cameras of other officers within a certain radius
of the event so that more cameras are offering context from
different angles.224 These are important developments. The
automation of recording can help avert the controversy, pain, and
accusations over missing video after a tragedy. Technology also
222 I am exploring the technological dimension in a forthcoming book.
MARY D. FAN,
CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING AND PRIVACY (forthcoming 2018).
223 See Laura Diaz-Zuniga, New Bodycams Start Recording with the Draw of A Gun, CNN
(July 21, 2017, 7:11 PM), http://cnn.it/2vJNMQr (discussing automatic activation technology
triggered by the removal of a weapon from its holster); Robert Maxwell, Lakeway Police
First to Use Automatic Body Cameras, KXAN (Austin, Tex.) (June 12, 2015, 4:57 PM),
http://kxan.com/2015/06/12/lakeway-police-first-to-use-automatic-body-cameras/ (discussing
recording activation triggers linked to a patrol vehicle’s “lights, siren, brake system, airbag,
dome light or doors”); Ryan Mason, More than A Body Cam, POLICE: THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT MAGAZINE (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.policemag.com/channel/technology/ar
ticles/2015/04/more-than-a-body-cam.aspx (describing Utility’s system, which “allows the
camera to automatically activate based on policies set by the agency” and triggers such as
the vehicle speeding over seventy-five miles per hour, entering into a geo-fenced area, or
during certain types of interactions).
224 See Nick Wing, New Police Body Camera Device Starts Recording When Cops Draw Guns,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/taser-signalpolice-body-camera_us_58b72c32e4b0284854b385b2 (describing the Signal Sidearm product
from Axon (Taser), which activates the officer’s body camera as well as other body cameras
within thirty-feet, upon the drawing of the officer’s firearm from its holster); Michael Fleeman
et al., L.A. Police to Get Tasers that Activate Body Cameras When Used, REUTERS (Jan. 6,
2015, 6:40 PM), http://reut.rs/1xPDACa (discussing Los Angeles Police Department’s purchase
of the Taser X26P weapon, which is linked via Bluetooth to Taser’s body cameras, “turn[s] on
the camera the second the Taser’s safety switch is thrown,” and “record[s] the date, time and
duration of firing, and whether Taser wires actually strike suspects and how long the
thousands of volts of electricity pulse through them.”).
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can help address mistrust over police discretionary decisions,
including the decision whether to record.225
While framing
effective remedies for errors and omissions is important, the
optimal approach is to reduce the risk of such problems arising
altogether, sparing police departments, the community, and the
courts the controversy and costs of redressing the missing video
problem.

225 See Joh, supra note 151, at 216–25 (discussing how technology can help address
controversies over police discretion in contexts such as traffic stops).
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APPENDIX A
The following jurisdictions, organized by population size in
descending order, are among the nation’s 100 largest municipalities
that had body camera policies available for collection and coding:
1. New York, NY

21. Milwaukee, WI

41. Anaheim, CA

2. Los Angeles, CA

22. Las Vegas, NV

42. Aurora, CO

3. Chicago, IL

23. Albuquerque, NM

43. St. Louis, MO

4. Houston, TX

24. Tucson, AZ

44. Riverside, CA

5. Philadelphia, PA

25. Fresno, CA

45. Corpus Christi, TX

6. San Antonio, TX

26. Sacramento, CA

46. Lexington, KY

7. San Diego, CA

27. Long Beach, CA

47. Stockton, CA

8. Dallas, TX

28. Mesa, AZ

48. Cincinnati, OH

9. San Jose, CA

29. Virginia Beach, VA

49. St. Paul, MN

10. Austin, TX

30. Atlanta, GA

50. Toledo, OH

11. San Francisco, CA

31. Colorado Springs, CO

51. Greensboro, NC

12. Fort Worth, TX

32. Raleigh, NC

52. Chula Vista, CA

13. Charlotte, NC

33. Omaha, NE

53. Durham, NC

14. Memphis, TN

34. Miami, FL

54. Winston-Salem, NC

15. Boston, MA

35. Oakland, CA

55. Chesapeake, VA

16. Seattle, WA

36. Minneapolis, MN

56. Scottsdale, AZ

17. Denver, CO

37. Cleveland, OH

57. Fremont, CA

18. Baltimore, MD

38. Wichita, KS

58. Gilbert, AZ

19. Portland, OR

39. New Orleans, LA

59. Boise, ID

20. Oklahoma City, OK

40. Tampa, FL

